E.C.-U.S. trade: a tale of eleven myths. European Community News No. 3/1987, 6 February 1987 by unknown
European Community 
No. 3/87 
February 6, 1987 
Con tact: Ella Krucoff 
(202) 862-9540 
B.c.-u.s. DADE: A TALE 01' BLBVBI ll1TIIS 
The high U.S. trade deficit has fueled protectionist pressure in the United 
States, much of it directed against the European Community. Criticism of 
the E .c., however, is often based on misconceptions about the reasons for 
American trade problems. The attached document examines 11 myths relating 
to E.c.-u.s. trade, European farm policies and proposed u.s. trade 
legislation. 
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DELEGATION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
EC/US TRADE 
A TALE OF ELEVEN MYTHS 
Myth No. 1. Canada and Japan are the most Important markets for 
the US. 
Not so. Figures for 1986 show that the European Community (now 
with the addition of Spain and Portugal a Community of 12 
nations) was by far the biggest US export market at $53.2 billion, 
compared wt th US exports of $45. 3 b t 11 ton to Canada and $26. 9 
billion to Japan.~ Total US trade (exports and Imports) with the 
Community of 12 was $132.7 billion, compared with $114.0 billion 
with Canada and $112.3 bill ion with Japan. 
The big contrast in US trade with the Community, Canada and Japan 
is the trade deficit. With the Community and Canada, the trade 
deficit for 1986 was in the same ballpark - $26.4 bi 11 ton and 
$23.3 bill ion respectively. But for Japan it amounted to no less 
than $58.6 bi 11 ion. 
For farm exports a 1 so for the f i sea 1 year 1986 the Commun I ty 
easily retained its position as the biggest US export market -
$6.4 billion compared with $5.1 billion to Japan. Moreover, US 
farm exports to the EC declined by only 3 percent, compared with a 
fall of 19 percent to non-EC destinations, and now represent some 
25 percent of all US overseas sales. 
Myth No 2. The excesses of the Common Agricultural Po 1 Icy a re 
basically responsible for the worsening of trade relations 
between the EC and the US. 
Total American farm exports soared in just ten years (1970-1980) 
from $7 billion to $44 billion. Since then they have fallen 
dramatically to some $26 bill ion last year. The Community and the 
Common Agricultural Pol Icy (CAP) have been blamed for thf s fal 1. 
But this is not In accordance with the facts. According to the 
USDA, the recent fall in US farm exports reflects the strength of 
~: The EC Is considered a sing 1 e market because It Is a genu t ne 
customs union. It has removed al 1 tariffs and quotas between Its 
members and has a common trade policy and a common external tariff 
system. 
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the do 1 1 a r I n the ear 1 y 198 0 ' s, the 1 eve 1 of US support p r I c e s, 
the fact that developing countries had been strapped for cash In 
their purchases and have become more self-sufficient In farm 
production. Meanwhile, the EC as pointed out above has 
remained the US farmers' best customer, taking 25 percent of US 
farm exports. 
Myth No. 3. The Community is the biggest subsidizer of farmers in 
the world. 
The Community is not unique In its use of subsidies. Dan Amstutz, 
Under Secretary at the US Department of Agriculture, said In 
testimony before the House Agriculture Committee in November 1985 
(even before the recent major rise in Federa 1 farm expenditure): 
" I n my j u d gem en t , t he 1 ates t f i g u re s w i 1 1 show t hat Japan 1 ea d s 
the parade and I think the US will come in second and the EC will 
come in third." Last year the Community subs Id i zed 11 mi 11 ion 
farmers to the tune of $22 billion compared with $26 billion of 
Federal farm price expenditure on 2! mi 11 ion farmers in the US. 
Th i s has not meant Commun I t y fa rme r s 1 i v i n g h 1 g h on the hog . 
Their incomes over the last 10 years have declined 30 percent, 
compared with a general rise In incomes throughout the Community 
of 19 percent. 
Myth No. 4. The Community is hogging the world market with 
subsidized exports. 
The Community and the US compete only over about a quarter of US 
farm exports - mainly wheat and dairy products. The international 
trading rules provide that agricultural export subsidies are 
permitted but should not to be used to get more than an equitable 
share of the world market. What then has happened to the EC share 
of the world market in wheat and dairy products? In wheat the 
high point of the American exports was 1981/1982 when the US 
accounted for 49 percent of the world market. In 1984/1985 this 
had dropped to 36 percent. Was this the Community's 
responsibility? Hardly, since our share remained stable between 
14-16 percent. What about dairy products? For years the American 
share of the world market was ni 1. In 1985 it was 10 percent, an 
increase achieved mainly at the EC's expense. For milk the US 
pushed its share again at the EC's expense, from 10 percent to 
26 percent. 
Myth No. 5. The Community is doing nothing about it~ subsidies to 
farmers. 
The Community has taken real and painful measures to reform the 
CAP and to reduce the cost to the taxpayer. In 1984 and 1985 the 
Community reduced its price support for dairy products and 
grains. In 1985, for example, production of milk fell by between 4 
and 5 percent. Last year the Commission got through the Council a 
price freeze together with a number of other proposals such as a 
co-responsibility levy for grains, which together with the 1984 
price cut will make production less attractive. 
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In December 1986 the Community took some fateful decisions which 
in the pre-Christmas news rush did not get the attention they 
deserved. The Council of Ministers agreed that dairy production 
would be cut over a two-year period by just under 10 percent and 
that the support price of beef shou 1 d be reduced by some 13 
percent. The EC butter mountain - now at some 1.5 million metric 
tons - will be brought down to 350,000 tons and the beef mountain 
should be cut .bY some 50 percent to some 300,000 metric tons by 
the end of 1987. These agreements are the biggest changes in the 
Community's CAP since it was established in 1962. They will result 
in savings from the 1989 budget of between one and two bi 11 ion 
dollars. These cuts have been very unpopular with Community 
farmers. They are asking, ''If we are suffering these painful cuts 
what are our trading partners doing? Are Community farmers 
expected.to bear this burden alone?!" 
Myth No. 6.··unfair trading practices abroad amount to a "tilted 
playing field" against American exporters. 
In a recent article In the New York Times, William N. Walker, a 
lawyer who was Deputy U.S. Trade Representative from 1975-1977, 
wrote: "Advocates of the level playing field seem to assume that 
only foreigners engage in field-tilting. But we impose restraints 
of one kind or another on imports of meat, sugar, rice, peanuts, 
tobacco,. dairy products, textiles, apparel, motorcycles, 
automobi les, machine tools, semiconductors and steel. Concern is 
voiced about growing South Korean penetration of the United 
States market, but nearly 45 percent of South Korea's exports to 
the United States are already subject to restraint." In addition 
several measures recently introduced by the United States 
customs user fees, Superfund legislation and provisions of a new 
tax reform law which excludes foreign suppliers of small tourist 
aircraft from certain forms of credit have been made the 
subject of proceedings against the United States by the Community 
under provisions of the Genera 1 Agreement oh Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). 
The Commission is updat·ing its list 
which impede Community exports to 
circulated when available. 
of Arner i can trade 
the US. Copies 
barriers 
w i 1 1 be 
M th No. 7. Trade must deal with a trade deficit 
year. 
One fundamental cause of the trade deficit is the budget deficit. 
Until that is dealt with, the trade deficit, though smaller, will 
still be considerable. As Edmund T. Pratt, CEO of Pfizer Inc. 
testified to the Senate Finance Committee on 15 January: ''··· the 
single most important action that the [US] government could take 
as a correction to· the foreign trade deficit [ .•. is to take] 
actions that will effectively reduce the federal budget deficit 
to proportions that will enable domestic savings to equal or 
exceed doemestic investment so that we [the US] will no longer be 
a net international debtor." 
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Also, Commerce Secretary Baldrige has said that the 
competitiveness of U.S. industry needs to bi i~proved. 
Trade legislation can tackle a number of useful things 
authority to. engage in the new trade round, adjustment 
assistance, retraining and education. But any trade legislation 
which would only deal with the· mass.ive trade def,icit by imposing 
barriers to imports would lead to foreigners quickly retaliating. 
What features In a possible trade bill could be dang~rous? 
Several. Following are a few examples. 
Myth No. 8. Reciprocity must be sought sector by sector. 
It has been argued that unless foreigners give the US equal 
treatment in certain specific sectors such as telecommunications, 
barriers should be erected against their exports to the US. 
First, the notion of equal treatment may be in the eye of the 
beholder (witness the fact that the EC had a deficit with the US 
of at least half a bill ion dollars in telecommunications in 
1985). Second, everyone can find sectors in which one country 
gives better treatment than others. In the case of wool textiles, 
for instance, tariffs in the Community are less than half those in 
the US. To try and get reciprocity in every specific sector would 
mean massive new restrictions sprouting up everywhere on world 
trade. Reciprocity is essential in trade negotiations. But it can 
only be achieved, as it has in all past negotiations in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade, by overall reciprocity -
t rad Ing off the d I sadvantages In one sector for advantages In 
another. 
Myth No. 9. Taking a two-by-four to foreigners under Sections 201 
and 301 of the U.S. trade laws will cure the nation's ills. 
It Is all very well to ask for tough action under domestic 
legislation. But what matters is whether actions by a contracting 
party of the GATT are in conflict with the international trading 
rules. Otherwise, "tough" act ion by the US wi 11 be fol lowed by 
equally tough action by others against US exports. And it should 
always be remembered that the international trading rules on, say, 
subsidies and dumping may not be perfect - but It is the only law 
we have. Amendments need to proceed by multilateral agreement, not 
unilateral action. 
Myth No. 10. Across the board tariff increases could usefully 
raise funds to reduce the Federal deficit. 
This would conflict with the international obligations of the US 
as far as bound items were concerned. A bound item is one that has 
been negotiated in the GATT and cannot be changed without 
negotiation and compensation. In addition, "standstill" and 
"rollback" provisions were passed at the September 1986 launching 
of the Uruguay Round in Punte de 1 Este. This means GATT members 
are under the obligation not to introduce new trade restrictions 
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should try to roll back protectionism. Any measures to Increase 
tariffs would be a breach of these obligations and could lead to 
retaliation by other countries. 
Myth No. 11. Countries that presently had a growing current 
account surplus could usefully be required to cut their surpluses 
dramatically or face a severe special tariff Imposed by the US. 
Th I s a g a I n wo u 1 d con f 1 I c t w t t h the I n t e r n at t on a 1 o b 1 t g at I ons of 
the US, throw a large wrench tn the current round of trade 
negotiations and could easily boomerang. Other countries could pass 
similar legislation. In 1980 the US ran a surplus with the 
Community of $18 billion. Would the US appreciate it If when it 
gets Into a surplus position again with a number of its Important 
trading partners tariff Increases were to be imposed on American 
exports? 
